Splunk

HTTP Base64 Activity With JVM Errors

Last updated 2 days ago on 2026-11-21

About

The analytic associates each Zeek request containing a malformed Base64 value or a scripted decoder trigger with a nearby Base64-related HotSpot argument exception on the same server and Java PID. Sysmon child process, file creation, or process termination events from that PID add context and can raise confidence.
Platform
Splunk
Tags
Data Source: SplunkDomain: ApplicationRule Type: QueryOS: Any
Severity
medium
Risk Score
47
References
https://calif.io/java4shell/(external, opens in a new tab or window)https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17(external, opens in a new tab or window)
False Positives
One JVM can handle concurrent requests, so an exception may fall within 15 seconds of more than one malformed request. HotSpot logs do not carry the Zeek uid, and this search establishes time proximity rather than causation. Ordinary Java child processes and file writes can coincide with the request. Review the URI, Zeek uid, exception delay, Java PID, child image, and created path. Clock skew, PID reuse, and incorrect host/IP mapping can misassociate events. Sysmon evidence is supporting context and is not required for a result.
Source
View on GitHub(external, opens in a new tab or window)

Definition

Rule Language
SPL
Rule Type
query
text code block:
( `zeek_http_request_headers` header_name IN ( "AUTHORIZATION", "HTTP2-SETTINGS", "CONTENT-TYPE", "CONTENT-DISPOSITION", "PRIORITY", "X-CONSOLEANNOTATOR", "X-CONNECT-AUTHORIZATION", "X-CSRF-TOKEN" ) header_value="*=*" truncated=false ) OR ( `zeek_http_post_body` body="*=*" truncated=false ) OR ( `zeek_http_uri` uri IN ("*=*","*%3D*","*%3d*") ) OR ( `java_hotspot_exceptions` ( "*Input byte array has wrong*" OR "*IllegalArgumentException*" OR "*Base64$Decoder*" OR "*java/util/Base64*" ) ) OR ( `sysmon_linux` ( (EventID=1 ParentImage="*/java") OR (EventID=5 Image="*/java") OR ( EventID=11 Image="*/java" NOT TargetFilename IN ("*/_state/*","*/indices/*") ) ) ) | rex field=_raw "^\[(?<jvm_event_time_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_pid_raw>\d+)\]\[(?<jvm_level_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_tags_raw>[^\]]+)\]\s*(?<jvm_message_raw>.*)" | eval jvm_pid=coalesce(jvm_pid_raw,jvm_pid), jvm_tags=coalesce(jvm_tags_raw,jvm_tags), jvm_message=coalesce(jvm_message_raw,jvm_message) | eval event_time=_time, is_network=if(isnotnull('id.resp_h'),1,0) | eval observed_target=if(is_network=1,'id.resp_h',coalesce(dest,host,dest_ip)) | eval request_value=case( isnotnull(header_name),header_value, isnotnull(body),body, is_network=1,urldecode(uri) ), carrier=case( isnotnull(header_name),header_name, isnotnull(body),"POST body", is_network=1,"URI" ) | where is_network=0 OR len(request_value)>=65 | eval malformed_b64=if( is_network=1 AND match(request_value,"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_-])(?:(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]?==)|(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9_-]?==))(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"), 1,0 ), scripted_b64=if( is_network=1 AND isnotnull(body) AND like(body,"%Base64.getDecoder()%") AND like(body,"%new byte[65]%") AND like(body,"%[64] = (byte)61%"), 1,0 ) | eval event_kind=case( is_network=1 AND (malformed_b64=1 OR scripted_b64=1),"request", isnotnull(jvm_pid) AND like(jvm_tags,"%exceptions%"),"jvm", EventID=1 OR EventID=5 OR EventID=11,"sysmon" ) | eval java_pid=case( event_kind="request","network", event_kind="jvm",tostring(jvm_pid), EventID=1,tostring(ParentProcessId), EventID=5 OR EventID=11,tostring(ProcessId) ), request_uid=if(event_kind="request",uid."@".printf("%.6f",event_time),"-") | where isnotnull(event_kind) AND isnotnull(observed_target) AND isnotnull(java_pid) AND isnotnull(request_uid) | eval argument_error=if(event_kind="jvm" AND match(jvm_message,"(?i)IllegalArgumentException|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0), decoder_evidence=if(event_kind="jvm" AND match(jvm_message,"Base64[$]Decoder|java/util/Base64|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0), shell_child=if(EventID=1 AND match(Image,"/(ash|bash|csh|dash|eshell|fish|ion|ksh|mksh|rbash|sh|tcsh|zsh)$"),1,0), child_process=if(EventID=1,1,0), file_created=if(EventID=11,1,0), java_terminated=if(EventID=5,1,0), suspicious_file=if(EventID=11 AND match(TargetFilename,"(?i)(?:[.](?:jsp|sh|so)$|/(?:tmp|var/tmp|dev/shm|webapps)/)"),1,0) | eval request_marker=case( event_kind="request" AND scripted_b64=1,"scripted_decoder_trigger", event_kind="request" AND malformed_b64=1,"malformed_base64_request" ), src_ip=if(event_kind="request",'id.orig_h',null()), request_uri=if(event_kind="request",uri,null()), http_method=if(event_kind="request",method,null()), child_image=if(EventID=1,Image,null()), created_file=if(EventID=11,TargetFilename,null()) | bin _time span=1s | stats min(event_time) AS first_seen max(event_time) AS last_seen max(argument_error) AS argument_error max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence max(shell_child) AS shell_child max(child_process) AS child_process max(file_created) AS file_created max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file values(src_ip) AS src_ips values(request_uri) AS uris values(http_method) AS methods values(carrier) AS carriers values(request_marker) AS request_markers values(child_image) AS child_images values(created_file) AS created_files BY _time observed_target java_pid request_uid event_kind | rename observed_target AS dest | `get_asset(dest)` | eval target=coalesce(dest_asset_id,dest), bucket=floor(first_seen/15) | eval request_json=if( event_kind="request", json_object( "uid",request_uid, "time",first_seen, "src",mvindex(src_ips,0), "dest",dest, "uri",mvindex(uris,0), "method",mvindex(methods,0), "carrier",mvjoin(carriers,","), "marker",mvjoin(request_markers,",") ), null() ), bucket=if( event_kind="request", mvappend(tostring(bucket-1),tostring(bucket),tostring(bucket+1),tostring(bucket+2)), bucket ) | mvexpand bucket | eventstats values(request_json) AS candidate_requests BY target bucket | where event_kind!="request" AND isnotnull(candidate_requests) | mvexpand candidate_requests | eval request_uid=spath(candidate_requests,"uid"), request_time=tonumber(spath(candidate_requests,"time")), src=spath(candidate_requests,"src"), request_dest=spath(candidate_requests,"dest"), uri=spath(candidate_requests,"uri"), method=spath(candidate_requests,"method"), carrier=spath(candidate_requests,"carrier"), request_marker=spath(candidate_requests,"marker") | where (event_kind="jvm" AND last_seen>=request_time-3 AND first_seen<=request_time+15) OR (event_kind="sysmon" AND last_seen>=request_time-3 AND first_seen<=request_time+30) | stats min(request_time) AS request_time min(eval(if(argument_error=1,first_seen,null()))) AS exception_time max(last_seen) AS last_seen max(argument_error) AS argument_error max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence max(shell_child) AS shell_child max(child_process) AS child_process max(file_created) AS file_created max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file values(src) AS src values(request_dest) AS dest_ips values(uri) AS uri values(method) AS method values(carrier) AS carrier values(request_marker) AS request_markers values(child_images) AS child_images values(created_files) AS created_files BY target request_uid java_pid | where argument_error=1 AND decoder_evidence=1 | eval dest=mvindex(dest_ips,0), exception_delay=round(exception_time-request_time,3), confidence=case( shell_child>0 OR suspicious_file>0,"high", child_process>0 OR file_created>0 OR java_terminated>0,"medium", true(),"low" ), asset_id=target, firstTime=request_time, lastTime=last_seen | fields - argument_error decoder_evidence shell_child child_process file_created java_terminated suspicious_file dest_ips | sort 0 - firstTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `http_base64_activity_with_jvm_errors_filter`

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This rule was sourced from the official Splunk public repository. View the original rule on GitHub(external, opens in a new tab or window).